Aging world faces century of strain as birth rates plunge and immigration debates intensify
By Gwynne Dyer
Global birth rates have fallen dramatically over the past six decades, setting the stage for sweeping economic and social change across much of the world.
The global average fertility rate has dropped by half since 1960 and now stands just above the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. That figure, however, masks sharp regional differences. Only sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the Middle East maintain relatively high birth rates. In most other regions, policymakers are grappling with the prospect of aging populations and shrinking workforces.
Across the Americas, Europe, Oceania and much of Asia, fertility rates have declined at a rapid pace. South Korea presents one of the starkest examples. With a fertility rate of about 0.7 children per woman, its population of roughly 51 million could be cut in half within 50 years if the trend continues.
Other East Asian nations face similar challenges. China’s population of 1.4 billion is projected to fall sharply by the end of the century, while Japan’s population of about 125 million is also expected to decline significantly. Larger developing countries in Asia, including India and Indonesia, have fallen to around replacement-level fertility, though their declines began more recently.
A smaller population is not inherently problematic. Many countries functioned with fewer people in the past. The challenge lies in managing the transition from high to low birth rates. As younger generations become progressively smaller than older ones, societies face what demographers describe as inverted population pyramids — with fewer workers supporting growing numbers of elderly citizens.
China’s decades-long one-child policy illustrates the strain. The so-called “4-2-1” structure means one working-age adult may support two parents and four grandparents. For couples, that burden effectively doubles, in addition to raising children of their own.
The economic effects are far-reaching. Housing markets could weaken over time as the number of potential homebuyers declines. Health care and pension systems may face mounting pressure. The adjustment is likely to be costly and, in some cases, politically destabilizing.
Some wealthier countries could mitigate the impact through immigration, supplementing their labor forces and easing the strain on social systems. Such migration has already reshaped Western Europe and North America over recent decades. East Asian countries, analysts say, could pursue similar policies, though cultural and political resistance remains strong.
Potential migrants would most likely come from regions where birth rates remain high, particularly Africa and parts of the Middle East. Remittances sent home by workers abroad already total tens of billions of dollars each month and can play a significant role in developing local economies.
Immigration, however, remains a flashpoint in domestic politics. Right-wing populist movements in several countries have portrayed large-scale migration as a threat, often invoking so-called “replacement” narratives. Leaders including Britain’s Nigel Farage, France’s Marine Le Pen and U.S. President Donald Trump have made immigration restrictions central to their platforms. In Japan, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has also taken a hard line on immigration.
Critics argue that sharply limiting immigration could worsen the demographic crunch in aging societies, particularly in sectors such as health care that depend heavily on labor. Without either sustained immigration or significant technological advances, countries with rapidly aging populations may struggle to maintain current standards of care for the elderly.
Demographic trends unfold over decades, not election cycles. Whether governments choose to address declining birth rates through immigration, policy incentives for families or technological innovation will shape economic and social conditions for generations to come.