Ukraine: Once more around the loop
By Gwynne Dyer
If Ukrainians feel the time has come to surrender to Russia, they don’t need Donald Trump’s help. They can do that for themselves.
The Russian “peace” offer that Trump is trying to push on Ukraine is almost identical to the one Russian President Vladimir Putin pitched to him in Alaska last summer. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will reject it again unless he believes Ukraine’s defences are about to collapse. But why have they been stuck in this loop for so long?
Putin’s goal is to reunite parts of the former Soviet Union where at least a minority of the population speaks Russian, with Ukraine the biggest of those parts. Other areas include Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and perhaps Kazakhstan. Beyond that, he likely has no territorial ambitions, but doing even this would involve conquering about 50 million people.
Putin’s invasion of Ukraine can be seen as a heritage project to secure his historical position as one of Russia’s greats. But he would almost certainly not have attacked in 2022 had he known it would turn into a four-year war instead of a four-week conflict.
Now, he must secure a significant win in Ukraine to justify the toll on Russian forces. Otherwise, he risks losing power—and perhaps his life. In this narrowly defined sense, his refusal to compromise is rational, even though there has never been a plausible military threat to Russia itself.
Zelensky’s position is equally rational and equally inflexible. Although he is an unlikely war leader—a Russian-speaking Jew from the entertainment world—he quickly realized his job is to hold as much Ukrainian territory as possible for as long as possible.
God may ultimately favour the bigger battalions, but recent technological changes, especially drones, have given Ukraine a defensive edge. Ukrainian forces occasionally retreat in small increments along the 1,250-kilometre front, but at Russia’s current pace, its army would not reach Kyiv’s eastern suburbs until 2030.
Losing slowly is therefore not necessarily futile. Each month brings a chance for political, economic or technological developments that could improve Ukraine’s position in eventual ceasefire negotiations.
Zelensky must judge when the morale of his army and the public begins to break. At that point, he would need to secure whatever deal he could. But the agreement Trump’s team has reportedly cooked up with Putin’s people would already reduce Ukraine to a Russian colony. For now, Zelensky has nothing to lose by saying no.
Unless Ukraine is already at that breaking point, which seems unlikely.
Trump, by contrast, is in a hurry. He likely does not care what happens to Ukraine, but he could gain international prestige—and perhaps the Nobel Peace Prize—if he imposes a ceasefire before next year’s selection.
The ceasefire would need to satisfy Russia’s maximal demands, partly because of Trump’s unusual closeness with Putin and partly because Putin believes he is winning. A Ukrainian surrender would also end sanctions against Moscow and open up lucrative trade deals for Trump’s associates.
Trump’s leverage over Zelensky has waned, partly because he has monetized U.S. arms aid. Instead of direct transfers, aid is sold to NATO countries at full price, then passed on to Ukraine as interest-free loans or gifts.
The only direct pressure Trump can now exert is cutting off U.S. intelligence—a tactic he has already threatened. But history suggests he will likely be shamed into restoring the flow of intelligence before long.
The Ukrainians have not lost the war, and this is probably just another trip around the loop.