Trump eyes Greenland as “quick win” amid broader ambitions

By Gwynne Dyer

The self-styled “Crazy Gang” appears buoyed by what it calls a “brilliant success” in Venezuela and is already looking for its next target.

Like Alexander the Great, U.S. President Donald Trump seems to lament that there are no more worlds left to conquer. In fact, there are still plenty.

Colombia, for one, borders Venezuela and lies close to U.S. naval forces already operating offshore. Trump has openly mused about removing Colombian President Gustavo Petro, falsely claiming Petro is involved in cocaine production and trafficking to the United States.

“Operation Colombia sounds good to me,” Trump said last Monday.

In the same breath, he also referenced Mexico — “Something will have to be done about it” — Iran — “We are locked and loaded and ready to go” — and Cuba, which he said “looks like it’s ready to fall.”

Any of those actions, however, would require significant planning and the movement of military assets. Trump appears to be looking for something quicker.

Rapid victories tend to be smaller and less consequential — such as seizing Russian-registered oil tankers on the high seas. But there is one place on Trump’s list that could be taken quickly from a standing start: Greenland.

That may explain why White House deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller placed Greenland at the top of the agenda last Monday.

Greenland, a former colony that remains a self-governing territory within the Danish kingdom, is not a fully sovereign state. However, its population of about 57,000 can hold a referendum on independence at any time, which gives it some of the trappings of nationhood — even if only as a symbolic prize.

Were this a White House briefing, this is where officials would emphasize Greenland’s supposed strategic importance: warnings about Russian and Chinese interest in Arctic minerals, and claims that melting ice is opening up new shipping routes.

Trump repeated those assertions last Sunday, insisting Greenland is “covered with Russian and Chinese ships all over the place” and is critical to U.S. national security.

That claim does not stand up to scrutiny.

During a recent visit to Ilulissat on Greenland’s west coast, Russian and Chinese vessels were notable for their absence. Greenland’s strategic importance peaked during the Cold War, when radar stations and interceptor bases there were meant to counter Soviet bombers. Once ballistic missile technology replaced manned bombers, the U.S. military presence fell from about 10,000 personnel to roughly 200.

If Washington wants to increase troop levels, it already has the right to do so under existing treaties with Denmark. If it wants access to minerals, it can negotiate contracts and pay for them.

As for Arctic shipping, Russia’s Northern Sea Route is seeing increased traffic, but the Northwest Passage around Greenland and northern Canada remains largely impractical. Ice continues to collect among Canada’s Arctic islands, a condition likely to persist for decades.

Threat inflation, however, has long been a convenient cover for imperial ambition. There is no shortage of analysts willing to provide such warnings, and Trump regularly amplifies them.

Domestically, a Greenland invasion might pass with limited resistance, given the deference — or inertia — of much of the U.S. media. Internationally, the consequences would be far more severe.

Russia and China might quietly welcome such a move, but for the United States to seize territory from a country that has been a loyal member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for 77 years would shatter the alliance.

“Nobody’s going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland,” Miller said confidently — and he is likely correct. Denmark would be unable to mount an effective defence, and there would be no justification for unnecessary loss of life.

But the political fallout would be enormous.

“If the United States decides to militarily attack another NATO country,” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned, “then everything would stop. That includes NATO and, therefore, post-Second World War security.”

A new alliance excluding the United States could eventually emerge — with Washington cast as the adversary rather than the anchor. Whether such a shock would be enough to stir American voters ahead of November’s midterm elections remains an open question.

Or perhaps that hope is little more than wishful thinking.