Iran crackdown leaves tens of thousands dead, reshaping the country’s future

By Gwynne Dyer

After two weeks of near-total silence following the mass killing of Iranian protesters on Jan. 8–9, the partial restoration of internet access has allowed the first credible assessments of the death toll to reach the outside world. The picture that is emerging is grim.

The most plausible estimates range from roughly 22,000 to more than 30,000 deaths over two days. These figures are drawn largely from hospital admissions, mortuary records and reports of mass burial sites compiled before authorities fully shut down communications. Numerous witnesses report that security forces carried out executions inside hospitals, targeting protesters already receiving treatment for gunshot wounds, including injuries to the eyes and groin.

Iran has experienced deadly crackdowns before, but nothing on this scale. Security forces killed an estimated 3,400 people during unrest in 1981–82, more than 1,000 in 1988, 72 in the 2009 protests, between 300 and 1,500 in 2019, and 551 during the 2022–23 demonstrations. Even by the regime’s own standards, the January killings represent a qualitative break from the past.

Iran’s population of about 92 million is spread across a vast country, yet protests were reported in more than 400 cities and towns. With casualties this widespread, nearly every Iranian will know someone who knows someone who has been killed, wounded or imprisoned. The social and political consequences of this violence are irreversible.

Until now, the Islamic Republic retained the loyalty of a substantial minority of devout Shiite supporters, while many others tolerated the system in exchange for stability and personal space. That tacit bargain has collapsed. The state now governs primarily through fear. History suggests such regimes can endure for years, but only at a high human cost.

Recent Middle Eastern history offers contrasting precedents. During the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011–13, both Egypt and Syria faced large, initially non-violent protest movements. Egypt’s long-time ruler Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, and a free election brought an Islamist government to power. The military soon reversed the result, seizing control and crushing renewed protests. Security forces killed about 2,400 demonstrators in central Cairo, after which mass resistance subsided. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi remains in power, with consistent U.S. backing.

Syria followed a different path. The Assad regime responded to early protests in 2011 with immediate and sustained violence, triggering a civil war that lasted more than a decade. The conflict devastated the country and displaced roughly half the population. For a time, President Bashar al-Assad appeared to have survived, largely due to Russian military support.

That support weakened after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine diverted Moscow’s resources and attention. In late 2024, Assad was overthrown in a rapid offensive led by a small militia headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former Islamic State member. Al-Sharaa has pledged to govern Syria as a pluralistic democracy. While the promise is welcome, the country’s recent history counsels caution.

Iran is not an Arab state, and Shiite clerical rule differs from Sunni authoritarianism. Still, the region’s political trajectories have often converged. Even if Iran’s January protests had not been drowned in blood, the odds of a peaceful democratic transition were always low, given the regime’s entrenched security apparatus and ideological rigidity.

External factors further complicate the picture. Former U.S. president Donald Trump has again inserted himself into the Iran crisis, warning Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that a U.S. naval force is “floating beautifully toward Iran” and threatening another direct military strike. The remarks appear aimed less at aiding Iranian protesters than at regaining political attention.

Trump previously urged demonstrators to continue protesting and suggested that help was imminent. In reality, there was no practical military option to assist them, and by the time he spoke, the worst of the killings had already occurred. His current threats are tied instead to pressuring Tehran into renewed negotiations over its nuclear program—one he previously claimed to have dismantled.

The rhetoric is unlikely to alter events inside Iran. The violence has already reshaped the country’s political landscape, and the future will be determined primarily by forces within its borders.